Michigan Law Review
Volume 38

Issue 7

1940

TRIAL - DIRECTED VERDICT WHERE TESTIMONY IS
CONFLICTING
Edward S. Biggar
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Evidence Commons

Recommended Citation
Edward S. Biggar, TRIAL - DIRECTED VERDICT WHERE TESTIMONY IS CONFLICTING, 38 MICH. L. REV.
1121 (1940).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol38/iss7/26

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

19401]

TRIAL -

RECENT DECISIONS

DIRECTED VERDICT WHERE TESTIMONY is

II21

CONFLICTING

-

Defendants engaged the plaintiff to repair a barn roof. In his suit to recover
damages for injuries sustained while on the defendants' premises, the plaintiff
testified that he had been struck by a truck which one of the defendants had been
driving. The defendants testified that they had discovered the plaintiff lying
injured at the side of the barn, near a ladder which had been placed against it.
Defendants moved for a directed verdict, which was denied, and after a verdict
for the plaintiff, defendants appealed from the denial of their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Held, that plaintiff's story was based on
imagination or wilful falsehood and could not be believed. Judgment reversed,
with judgment ordered for the defendants notwithstanding the verdict. A dissenting opinion contended that the record justified a new trial but did not
warrant the entry of a final judgment for the defendants. Brulla v. Cassady,
2o6 Minn. 398, 289 N.W. 404 (1939).
Although there is not entire judicial accord as to the test to be applied on a
motion for a directed verdict,' the prevailing view is that expressed in the
principal case; namely, that a verdict for the moving party will be directed if the
court, in the exercise of its manifest duty,' would have to set aside a verdict

'Some courts will look only to the evidence of the adverse party. First Nat.
Bank v. Spiers, ISo Okla. 6q, 265 P. r37 (1928). Other courts will examine the

evidence on both sides with a view to the possibility of sustaining a contrary verdict.
McCormack v. Standard Oil Co., 6o N. J. L. 243, 97 A. 617 (r897); Chicago,
Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Coogan, 71 U. S. 47?, 47 S. Ct. 564 (1926). All, or
almost all, courts will grant the motion if the adverse party has produced only a
scintilla of evidence. See generally, 26 R. C. L. 1070 (1920).
2
1t is sometimes said that the proper test is whether the court, in the exercise
of its judicial discretion, should set aside a contrary verdict. Patton v. Texas & P.
Ry., 179 U. S. 658, 21 S. Ct. 275 (19oI); Spaulding v. New York Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 94. Vt. 42, io9 A. 22 (1920).
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against him.' It is the application of this well-recognized rule which gives particular significance to the principal case. The plaintiff's account, that he had
had been injured through the negligence of the defendants and by no fault of
his own, stated a dear case for his recovery. But the defendants' testimony, in
support of a theory that the plaintiff's injuries were due to his falling from the
barn roof, set forth an equally plain case for non-liability. The two stories b.eing
in irreconcilable conflict, it was apparent that one of the parties was guilty of
deliberate falsification; this much was conceded by opposing counsel.* Numerous
facts in evidence lent credence to the defendants' testimony and made the
plaintiff's explanation seem improbable. A bunch of shingles was found on the
barn ioof; and the roof of the barn lean-to bore fresh marks as though someone
had skidded upon it. Plaintiff's clothes were not torn, and aside from a forehead
abrasion and fractures of the wrists, arms and pelvis, there were apparently no
bruises or discolorations on his body. Nor were there any suspicious markings on
the defendants' truck or on the ground near the place at which the plaintiff
said that he had been struck. On this state of the evidence 5 a jury would be
expected to find against the plaintiff; but there is grave doubt as to whether a
court which is not sitting as a trier of facts may properly elect to disbelieve any
of the testimony introduced in the case. It is generally conceded that the credibility of witnesses is a jury question.' Where there is a direct conflict of testimony the courts almost invariably decline to direct a verdict,7 except in cases
where the testimony of one party is inherently unbelieveable, as being contrary
3

Principal case, 289 N. W. 404. at 407. The statutory motion for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict is tested by the same rules applicable to the motion for
a directed verdict. Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927), § 9495: "upon a . . . motion that

judgment be entered notwithstanding the verdict ... the court shall grant the same
if the moving party was entitled to such directed verdict." See also, Hunt v. United
Bank & Trust Co., 2io Cal. 1o8, 291 P. 184- (1930) ; Malewski v. Mackiewich, z8z
Ill. App. 593 (1935).
'Principal case, 289 N. W. 404 at 4-11.

Other facts which damaged the plaintiff's credibility were: (T) the nature
of the work which the defendant truck-driver had set out to do rendered it unlikely

that he would have returned to the farm in time to have caused plaintiff's injury; (2) an
engineer's plat revealed no obstruction such as plaintiff claimed had cut off his vision,
from the place at which he was struck, to the highway; (3) plaintiff made no direct
claim of defendants' liability, to the defendants, until two months after the injury.
6 Begert v. Payne, (C. C. A. 6th, 1921) 274 F. 784; Krenz y. Lee, io4 Minn.
455, 116 N. W. 832 (908).
"The writer has found only one case (not including cases of the type referred
to in note 8, infra) in which the moving party obtained a directed verdict in spite of
contradictory testimony by the adverse party. In Kohn v. National Film Corp. of
America, 6o Cal. App. 11?, 212 P. 207 (1922), a verdict was directed for defendant
corporation on its plea of accord and satisfaction, although the plaintiff testified that
the settlement in question did not purport to be conclusive as to all damages sustained
by him. There is language in Thompson v. Pioneer-Press Co., 37 Minn. z85, 33
N. W. 856 (i887), which indicates that a verdict may be directed where the facts
set forth in the opposing testimony are "out of the ordinary course of human conduct,"
but the court, in that case, merely granted a new trial.
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to some physical or natural law.8 And while the plaintiff's story, in the principal case, seems improbable, it is not physically or inherently impossible; so that
this exception is not applicable. It would seem that the principal decision is a
plain affirmation of the court's willingness to decide upon the credibility of witnesses as a matter of law. The tenor of the opinion is well illustrated by such
language as: "the imputation is an act so brutal... that we should not accept it
unless the facts and circumstances unerringly point to such a conclusion" 9 and
"Not only must we condemn Angus [one of the defendants] as a deliberate
perjurer, but likewise . . . their old father, now rapidly approaching the time

when he must answer the final call." "0There are, of course, policy arguments
favoring the court's position. It may be said that repeated trials are undesirable
and that there should be an end to litigation. This argument is particularly
persuasive as applied to the principal case, since there was no indication that the
plaintiff would be able to produce more convincing evidence on a new trial."
But, on the other side, it must be clear that the present decision represents an
extreme view '2 of a court's power to remove a case from the province of the
jury. If the jury system is to be maintained as a vigorous and effective institution, it may be well to discourage any attempts, by the courts, to usurp the
historical jury functions.
Edward S. Biggar

8QuockTing v. United States, 140 U. S. 417, II S. Ct. 733, 851 (1890);
Roberts v. Roberts, 168 Cal. 307, 14z P. io8o (1914); People v. Strause, 29o
IM. 259, z25 N. E. 339 (i919).
0 Principal case, 289 N. W. 404 at 408.
10 Ibid.

"-The only question as to which the evidence seemed incomplete concerned the
presence or absence of bruises and general discoloration on the plaintiff's body. It did
not appear, however, that plaintiff had made any attempt to obtain the attending
physician, or nurses, as witnesses. Principal case, 289 N. W. 404- at 411.
12 For a criticism of the concept of incredibility as a matter of law, see Rothschild,
"Summary Judicial Powers," i9 CoRN. L. Q. 361 (1934).

